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2.12.1 Introduction
Performance of lifelines during the April 6 event
may be considered generally good if compared
to the extended losses related to buildings
(Verderame et al., 2009), nevertheless damages
and service downtime, which required recovery
and emergency management, occurred. In the
following, for each of the main lifelines in the
L’Aquila area (i.e., road network, water distribu-
tion, gas distribution, power distribution, water
distribution and treatment, telecommunications
and post-event aid to population), the emer-
gency management strategies adopted to
recover the systems and restore their functional-
ity in the shortest possible time are described.
Finally, criteria adopted to define priorities and
to allocate resources for the temporary housing
camps are discussed. From the reported investi-
gations it is concluded that the emergency man-
agement of the lifelines networks provided a
rapid and resilient response to the earthquake.
The emergency management procedures imple-
mented for the physical and functional restora-
tion of lifelines, after a proper codification may
become a reference model for the Civil Defence
at international level.
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2.12.2 Road Network
ANAS S.p.A. is the agency that manages in the
Abruzzo Region, as well as in the rest of the
national territory, the state road network. The
residual functionality and safety investigation of
the road network were the first priorities identi-
fied by ANAS for the management of the first
phase of the emergency. Physical and human
resources were deployed to achieve the follow-
ing goals: 1) rapid survey of the road network to
ensure, at the largest possible extent, the
regional mobility; 2) activation of emergency
contracting procedures (“somma urgenza”
agreements) to immediately begin, where possi-
ble, activities for the restoration of normal mobil-
ity conditions; 3) damage survey of the road-
network components; 4) short term planning for
the repair of damaged components.
At the same time, physical and human resources
were deployed in support of the Civil Defence
for a first partial debris removal and for the
excavations works necessary for the installation
of relief campsites. It worth mentioning that, fur-
ther to the local resources, additional ones were
used to manage the emergency. These resources
were available from few ANAS’ Regional com-
partments differently located on the national ter-
ritory, with an average daily commitment of 80
men and 70 vehicles.
Rockfalls (Fig. 1a) and landslides triggered by
the earthquake and aggravated by the heavy
rain that hit the area in the days following the
event, were identified as the most problematic
situations affecting the network mobility. How-
ever, the rock falls and landslides occurred
mainly in mountainous areas around L’Aquila,
while the main road network in the city was not
affected by the aforementioned phenomena. In
the urban area, mobility limitations were caused
by debris following damaged and/or unsafe
residential and monumental buildings adjacent
to the roads.
Immediate activities for the restoration of normal
mobility conditions included: 1) removal of rocks
and soil from the roads; 2) rock slope consolida-
tions; 3) enhancement of soil slope stability.
These activities were conducted employing,
where possible, internal resources or activating,
alternatively, emergency contracting procedures
with external organisations. Securing of unsafe
buildings adjacent to roads was carried out by
firemen.
Temporary traffic management measures were
extensively implemented in order to minimize
road closures; these measures included traffic
flow restrictions; alternating one-way; lane and
velocity restrictions (Fig. 1b).
The only significant damages occurred to the
road network components were the structural
failure of the viaduct “Corfinio” on the national
roadway SS5 and the collapse of a bridge on
the main road SP36 “Forconese”. No further
significant damages were reported to the com-
ponents of the road networks including the
numerous tunnels present in the Region that per-
formed well.
The urgent need for a standardized and struc-
tured survey form to report damages and dis-
ruptions in the road networks was highlighted
while performing safety investigation and dam-
age survey operations. A rapid survey form and
an ad-hoc procedure were therefore identified
and formalised while the survey work was in
progress.
The timely information on the mobility conditions
was a key component of the effective emergency
management. The Civil Defence issued daily a
report summarising road closures, mobility restric-
tions and repair works carried out in the road net-
work. Using a Geographic Information System,
GIS, the technical compartment of the Direction of
Command and Control, Di.Coma.C represented
this information in a cartographic format. Road
closures and other temporary traffic management
measures were overlaid to aerial photographs,
technical regional maps, etc. providing maps that
had a fundamental role in supporting many emer-
gency management operations.
As for the public information, emergency bul-
letins were regularly issued to update in real-
time the end-users about the mobility situation in
the Abruzzo Region. Communications and
timely news were, as well, posted on the ANAS
website.
Once the firth phase of the emergency was man-
aged, efforts and resources were concentrated,
on one hand, to handle the modified traffic con-
ditions in L’Aquila city due to the closure of the
main road that ran through the city and, on the
other hand, to respond to the new mobility
requirements created by the relief camps, and
by the construction of the provisional accommo-
dation: Temporary Housing Modules M.A.P.,
and C.A.S.E. project.
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Fig. 1
Impact of the earthquake on
the road network: (a) SS80
“Gran Sasso d’Italia” road
affected by rock falls, but
featuring rock-proof tunnels.
(b) Distribution of traffic
management solutions
(updated to 01/05/09) for
the 61 road tracts affected
by the earthquake (red =
road closed; dark green =
passable with limitations;
yellow = alternating one
way; light green = lane and
velocity restictions).
28%
6%
46%
20%
Road closed
Passable with limitations
Alternating one way
Lane and velocity restictions
a. b.
2.12.3 Water distribution network
Gran Sasso Acqua G.S.A. SpA is the water
provider for L’Aquila city and for 37 municipalities
in the earthquake area. The organisation offers an
integrated water service including potable water
supply, sewerage and wastewater treatment.
The G.S.A. has 3 major supply systems (Chiarino,
Gran Sasso, Water Oria) in addition to some sec-
ondary ones. The water supplied is transported
by a network consisting of approximately 900 km
of large diameter pipes and is stored in a huge
number of tanks (about 200) that require contin-
uous functional and hygienic monitoring and
maintenance. The water is distributed from the
tanks to approximately 100000 customers
through a 1100 km distribution network made of
quite old cast iron and steel pipes. The pressure
inside the main pipeline network is quite high,
reaching 30-50 atm., as well as in the distribution
networks where it can reach 6-8 atm.
Thanks to a remote control service and guided
valves connected, through cables or wireless
connection, to the main reservoirs and supply
systems, it is possible to check the water flow
inside the pipeline network and to manage par-
tial or total opening/closing operations directly
from the Gran Sasso Acqua headquarters. In
particular, electromagnetic sensors, measuring
input low pressure, and electromagnetic gauges
(or “Clamp on”), measuring output differential
pressures, are installed in the tanks. The remote
control service allows furthermore the assess-
ment of the water level in the tanks.
The equipment connected to the remote control
system revealed, on the morning of April 6, a
significant and sudden change in the water flow
for a main pipeline in Paganica. The immediate
closure of the relative shutters for that pipe was
operated directly from the GSA headquarters,
before the technician team reached the affected
site. The cause of the rupture was identified in
the fault crossing the Paganica pipe. Because of
that, the steel joint of the pipeline (diameter Ø =
600 mm; pressure 25-30 atm) slip-off, causing
a violent escape of water (Fig. 2a).
A connection portion at the joint, however, was
still grasped for a length of 6cm. In order to
quickly respond to the emergency, the repair was
limited to the welding of the pipes at the joint.
Exception made for the aforementioned joint slip-
off, no significant damage was observed to the
main distribution and storage system. Following
the repair of the damaged joint it was, therefore,
possible to restart the provision of potable water
for all municipalities administered by the G.S.A.
SpA since the evening of April 6. As a lot of rup-
tures were expected in the minor water distribu-
tion system, in order to prevent flooding and
deterioration in the buildings already damaged,
the decision was made, not to restore the water
distribution in L’Aquila historical centre and in the
most affected villages. For these areas, the
restoration of the water provision was gradually
operated starting from the less affected zones
and/or the zones with a strong need for reacti-
vation; priority was given to the strategic serv-
ices, secondly to the commercial and industrial
activities, including the hotels to be reopened for
the G8 meeting, and finally to the residential
buildings classified safe, after the specific AeDES
survey. The partial restoration of the water distri-
bution was possible because of secondary net-
works and of a shutter system that allowed the
exclusion of areas where the water supply was
not urgently needed. A few days after the earth-
quake (19 April), due to a further slip of the fault,
the welded joint of Paganica pipe broke, requir-
ing a further repair intervention.
The priorities identified in the second phase of
the emergency management were, on one hand,
the provision of the water service to the relief
campsites and, on the other hand, the manage-
ment of all the activities for restoring the water
provision in L’Aquila City. To carry out the works
for the water network connection in the relief
campsites, the technical staff of the company
(fully operative since the third day after the
earthquake) was supported by the “Genio
Civile” staff. On the other hand, the works for
repairing damages and restoring the functional-
ity of the water service in L’Aquila were oper-
ated, where possible, by the G.S.A. SpA techni-
cians, or activating emergency outsourcing pro-
cedures for the most demanding operations.
Relationships with external organizations have
been unfortunately, nowadays, interrupted
because of the financial difficulties that the com-
pany is undertaking due to the lack of income.
Most commonly observed damages in the minor
distribution system were the slippage/breakage
of the joints and the breaking of cast iron pipes
(Fig. 2b). It is important to emphasize, however,
that in large part of the “red zones” (damaged
zones with prohibited access) the water network
is still closed. Because of that, it has not yet been
possible to completely estimate the extent and 211
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Fig. 2
Impact of the earthquake on
the water distribution
network: (a) Joint slip-off in a
main water network pipeline
in Paganica. (b) Repair on
a cast iron pipe in a
Paganica at the moment
when some of the
evacuated people were
returning home.
Joint slip-off in a main water
network pipeline in Paganica.
a. b.
the spread of the damage suffered by the net-
work1.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the drinking
water purity and quality has been officially
tested and certified daily since the early days
after the seismic event. Because the G.S.A. offi-
cial testing laboratory was severely damaged
after the earthquake, this service was guaran-
teed via mobile laboratories of a neighboring
water organization, C.A.M.
The third phase of the emergency management
focused on the construction of the water distribu-
tion network and connections for the sites identi-
fied for the construction of the provisional
accommodation: Temporary Housing Modules
M.A.P., and C.A.S.E project. Both the design
and the new construction of the reservoirs and of
the distribution network for these areas were
committed to external organizations and con-
tractors. The costs for both the design and the
construction of the new reservoirs and networks
for the temporary accommodation were covered
by the Civil Defence. The G.S.A. SpA will con-
tinue to be in charge of the management of the
water provision for the temporary accommoda-
tion areas.
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1 The water consumption was reduced by 30% as a result of water shut off into the ‘red zones’. Mobile water tankers were used to
serve the relief camps in the first days after the quake.
2.12.4 Wastewater treatment plant
The technical visits at the wastewater treatment
plants serving L‘Aquila (AQ), in the resorts of
Ponte Rosarolo, Pile and Arischia, and at that
located in the City of Corfinio (AQ ) have shown
that examined systems have similar technical
characteristics, as they have the same practical
functions (Nigro & Bilotta, 2009). Each plant
was equipped both with the structures necessary
for the treatment of wastewater (primary clarifier
tank, aeration tank, digestion tank, settling tank,
thickener, sludge dewatering band press and
chlorinator system) and with those for manage-
ment purposes (buildings used as offices, rooms
for technical equipment and laboratories).
The facility in Ponte Rosarolo is located near the
historical center of L’Aquila (42°20’18.10”N -
13°23’39.09”E). Structures were built the ‘60-
‘70. The reinforced concrete digestion tank suf-
fered partial collapse of a longitudinal wall (Fig.
3a), several vertical cracks on a transversal wall
and the separation of orthogonal walls at the
edges (Fig. 3b). The partial collapse of the wall
also involved the steel pipe adducting waste-
water that was connected to it. In buildings used
as offices, local technological and laboratory
equipment (RC framed structure) were also
found cracks of both internal partitions and
external walls. However, there were no evi-
dences of damage to structural elements: the
cracks detected on non-structural elements did
not represent significant damages and did not
prevent the use of building. The inspected facili-
ties were therefore useable at the time of inspec-
tion, except the digestion tank that was useless.
Due to this damage the tank has lost water and
the plant were partially closed by reducing the
disposal capacity of about 60%. The remaining
functionality was still sufficient to face the
demand, which was significantly reduced due to
the large number of evacuated people (approx-
imately 30,000), housed outside the city.
The structures of facility in Pile (42°21’3.25”N -
13°22’13.41”E), which is situated between the
town and the industrial area of L’Aquila being
the second plant serving the city, were realized
in two different periods (‘80 and 2000) with RC
walls and slabs. Structural damages were not
detected, only some damages to the partitions of
local offices occurred. With regard to the older
settling tanks, characterized by a circular cross
section, a deterioration of the curbing RC beam
was detected due to significant corrosion of the
steel reinforcements.
The inspected structures, therefore, were viable
and fully functional despite the damages (of
non-seismic origin), due to degradation of mate-
rials descending from a insufficient maintenance
of the settling tanks. However, in the control
room, a tube connected to the pump (not
anchored) was damaged due to a displacement
of 15 cm, figure 3c. Finally it should be noted
that this plant has been out of energy for three
days after the earthquake, so it worked through
its own backup generator.
The plant located in Arischia (42° 24’49 .02 “N
- 13° 20’25 .48” E) presents reinforced concrete
structures with the exception of the circular tanks
for leaching, consisting of circular walls of arti-
ficial masonry blocks connected with a RC curb
at the top of the tank, and a gravity retaining
wall. The structures date back to the 70s with the
exception of RC curb which was more recently
constructed. Cracks on the walls of a distribution
trap and damages to the retaining stone wall,
which led to the partial obstruction of the
hydraulic groove drain at the base of the tank,
were observed. With regard to the circular
tanks, one of the two rotating distributors was
put out of service for damage to its support; the
cracks found on some blocks of the structure
were dated before the earthquake. Therefore,
the inspected facilities were functional, although
the restoration of the full functionality of the
hydraulic facility required some minor rehabili-
tation and repair of the tank distributor. In any
case, the age of the plant suggests a constant
monitoring even after the remedial action.
The treatment facility in Corfinio (AQ) situated
not far from the center of the same town
(42°7’25.74”N - 13°50’31.78”E) is a RC con-
struction built in the 90s. The central part of the
longitudinal walls of the aeration tank, sepa-
rated from lateral walls, shows a rotation very
probably occurred in large part before the seis-
mic event, as witnessed by the comparison of the
positions of monitoring slides before and after
the earthquake; such slides were applied two
years before the event: the displacements due to
the earthquake did not compromise the
hydraulic seal of the joint, nor the functionality
of the structure.
A comprehensive analysis of the observed dam-
ages was carried out in relation to the position of
each facility with respect to the epicenter of the
earthquake of 6 April 2009 (UTC 01.32 hours)
and to the records provided by the National Net-
work Accelerometric (RAN) available (Chioc-
carelli et al., 2009). It can be observed that:
- Ponte Rosarolo facility is located near the
epicenter and close to the AQK acceleromet-
ric station, which recorded ground accelera-
tions equal to 3.7 m/s2 equal to about 50%
of the maximum value recorded for the same
seismic event (station AGV - 6.6 m/s2); after
the earthquake, the plant has shown dam-
ages to the tanks with rectangular walls
larger than those found in circular tanks of
the Pile plant, despite the geographical
proximity. The structural behavior of the cir-
cular tanks was essentially better than that of
the rectangular ones, mainly because of the
lack of structural details ensuring effective
connection between the orthogonal walls;
- Arischia plant lies about 5 km from the
L’Aquila accelerometric stations AQV, AQG
and AQA, which recorded maximum
ground acceleration values; even if distant
from the epicenter (approximately 10 km), it
has shown some structural damages;
- The Corfinio plant was not damaged
because distant from the epicenter (approxi-
mately 50 km): the maximum acceleration
recorded by the accelerometers of Sulmona
station (Sul) located near the plant, is indeed
equal to 0.34 m/s2, approximately one-
twentieth of the maximum recorded at AQV
Station of L’Aquila.
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Fig. 3
Ponte Rosarolo Plant.
Digestion Tank: (a) partial
collapse of a longitudinal
wall and of the pipe
connected to it. (b) Detail of
the detachment of the
orthogonal walls at the
edges. (c) Displacement of
the pump in the control
room.
a. b. c.
2.12.5 Gas distribution network
Enel Rete Gas S.p.A. is the gas provider for
L’Aquila city and for other 5 municipalities in the
earthquake affected area, namely Lucoli, Torn-
imparte, Ocre, Rocca di Cambio Rocca di
Mezzo.
The gas is distributed via a 621 km pipeline net-
work, 234 Km of that with gas flowing at aver-
age pressure (2.5-3 bar) and the remaining 387
Km with gas flowing at low pressure (0,025-
0035 bar).
The medium pressure network is connected to
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the high pressure national one (namely SNAM
network) through 3 reduction cabins while,
about 300 reduction groups allow for the trans-
formation of the gas transport pressure (2.5-3
bar) into the gas distribution pressure (0,025-
0035 bar).
The gas network is mainly made of steel pipes,
with an average internal diameter of Øintenal =
125 mm (external diameter Øexternal = 139.7
mm) and the joints are mainly welded.
The first priority identified for the management
of the gas network, in the first phase of the emer-
gency immediately after the earthquake, was the
timely securing of the network in order to avoid
explosions, gas leaks and fires and to allow the
emergency vehicles and the USAR teams to act
in the safest possible way.
To ensure this priority, the entire network man-
aged by Enel Rete Gas S.p.A. in the affected
area was shut off via the closure of the 3 reduc-
tion cabins. Thanks to this decision, and to the
rupture of a pipeline near Onna (Fig. 4a), it was
possible to timely and significantly reduce the
gas pressure and to avoid the occurrence of sec-
ondary effects. The subsequent closure of the
300 reduction groups ensured the full securing
of the network in less than two hours after the
earthquake. In the days following the event, the
gas valves external to each residential building
were as well closed. The pipeline damaged in
Onna was replaced with a new one that was too
rigidly connected to a reinforce-concrete sup-
port. It is worth highlighting that, as a result of
the earthquake, the Enel Rete Gas headquarters
in L’Aquila resulted unusable. Because of that the
chief executive and the staff had to manage the
emergency without the support of their data,
software and maps. Luckily, the national society
Enel Rete Gas has, at a national level, an inte-
grated information system, including a data
base and a geographical information system
GIS. Making reference to the closest Enel Rete
Gas headquarters in Teramo and Pescara, it was
possible to reprint the maps and all the docu-
mentation necessary to operate.
The second phase of the emergency response
was focused on the activation of the physical
and human resources in support to the Civil
Defence. The timely provision of gas to the
strategic structures was the first priority identi-
fied and was operated via mobile reduction
cabins and gas wagons. H24 shift were organ-
ized for the local technical and administrative
teams, as well as for the teams coming from
other areas of the national territory including the
Enel Rete Gas national headquarters in Milan. In
the first month after the earthquake, the daily
commitment of physical and human resources
resulted on average approximately equal to 70
men and 35 vehicles, including equipped trucks,
gas wagons and gas-leak detectors.
On the same time, activities for the reactivation
of the gas provision were started. The reactiva-
tion of the shut gas network required to operate
gradually restoring, first of all, the gas flow into
the medium pressure network, secondly the gas
flow in the low pressure network, up to each
external valve pertinent to each residential
building previously closed.
Reactivation of the service was managed accord-
ing to the following four steps: 1) seal verifica-
tion; 2) nitrogen check; 3) repair of damaged
pipes and/or valves; 4) reopening. In the seal
verification phase, the detection of broken pipes
and/or the possible joint slip-off was made, act-
ing in the first instance, from node to node, and
further segmenting the network when necessary.
The material and equipment needed for the
repair was immediately available from the inte-
grated logistics system which Enel Rete Gas
uses; actually, the material normally in storage
in the Battipaglia inter-harbour to perform ordi-
nary repairs and maintenance works, was sim-
ply diverted to L’Aquila. The adopted strategy
ensured the remediation and testing of more
than 90% of the gas network in three month time
after the earthquake. The diagram in figure 4b
shows how, three months after the quake, it was
possible to restart the gas distribution for all the
end-users with a safe home, exception made for
L’Aquila city.
It is worth mentioning that the reconnection of
the individual user supplies required, on one
hand, the definition of the priorities to be fol-
lowed and, on the other hand, the definition of
the testing procedures to be carried out to certify
the safety of the gas systems that were subjected
to the action of the earthquake. As for the prior-
ities, those identified by the Civil Defence were
followed; namely, the service was provided first
of all to the strategic buildings, secondly to the
manufacturing and industrial plants, and finally
to the residential buildings identified as safe
after the AeDES ispection. As for the testing pro-
cedures, in accordance with the procedures
used by Enel Rete Gas for routine checks, an ad
hoc protocol was defined in collaboration with
the Civil Defence and the Firefighter Depart-
ment. It was decided to reconnect each single
user following the fulfillment of four conditions:
1) safe dwelling (classified as A following the
AeDES survey); 2) leak-tightness checking; 3)
11,1%
38,2%
25,1%
100,0%
43,2%
100,0%
20,1%
100,0%
50,7%
100,0%
69,2%
100,0%
L'Aquila Lucoli Ocre Rocca di
Cambio
Rocca di
Mezzo 
Tornimparte
End-users that can be 
potentially reconnected
End-user reconnected with 
respect to total that can be 
potentially reconnected
operative test of the equipment; 4) smoke test. It
is worth mentioning that the Civil Defence fully
covered the cost of the whole procedure to
reconnect the individual users to the gas service
and that a dedicated phone line (Line Amica
Abruzzo) was specifically set up to facilitate and
support the end-users in this operation.
As a final note it is worth remembering that no
damages were detected to the gas storage facil-
ities.
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Fig. 4
Impact of the earthquake on
the gas distribution network:
(a) Onna (AQ), damaged
pipeline.
(b) End-user gas connections
activeted on June 8 2009
(Green = end-users that can
be potentially reconnected;
Bleu = end-user reconnected
with respect to total that can
be potentially reconnected).
a. b.
2.12.6 Electric power distribution network and
telecommunications
It was reported that two substations serving the
greater L’Aquila had damaged connections
between a rigid bus and insulator, figure 5a. That
was due to shifting of the un-anchored transform-
ers during the earthquake. Also due to sloshing of
the cooling oil within the transformer, cooling oil
pressure increased, and actuated the safety shut
off feature to avoid costly damage. One of the
transformers moved about 14 cm. In the distribu-
tion system, 30 posts were damaged causing sev-
ered links that resulted in service disruption. More
than 180 pedestal type connection boxes were
dislocated and severed cable connections at the
termination lugs that resulted in localized power
failure (Fig. 5b). The Electric Power Control Cen-
ter at L’Aquila sustained severe damage, both
building and equipment, and it had to be moved
to a temporary building in the yard of the build-
ing premise. It took three days to complete the
move, while the essential part of the system was
functional by 9 AM the day after the earthquake
(Fig. 4). Transformers in substations were not
anchored. We noted that steel angles were
welded on the tracks that the transformers were
supported to stop sliding, figure 6a. This was
done after the earthquake. However the steel
angles seemed to be under sized. In the control
house of substations, the batteries were not
anchored or tied to the racks, figure 6b. There
was no batteries damage reported at these sub-
stations. Some locations were without power for
three days, e.g. wastewater treatment plant.
Telecommunication service performed reason-
ably well. It went off air for a couple of hours
right after the earthquake. Cellular phones
seemed to be the main means of telecommunica-
tion in this small community. Although there was
no reported damage to the physical equipment
and equipment building, we saw a number of
temporary cellular sites deployed within the
earthquake impacted areas. The increase of cell
sites might have reduced the circuit overload
that commonly occurs after an earthquake. Both
Fire Fighters and Police used their own radio
system as the primary communication tool. Cel-
lular phones were also used to compliment the
radio system. With a good backup power gen-
eration plant, their communication was not inter-
rupted. The Fire department had three repeater
stations, which were not damaged. A number of
landlines were damaged or severed, as repairs
were evident during our investigation. Since ten-
ants were not allowed back to their houses or
apartments, most landlines were not used.
Hence the demand on this circuit became much
lighter.
2.12.7 Temporary housing
The Italian government organizations and
NGOs (Non-Government Organization) were to
be commended on a great effort providing the
victims with relief services and care. The military
and fire brigade set up service camps to pro-
vided needed services to the victims. Some of the
relief campsites provided the victims with Inter-
net services in addition to daily necessities such
as medication, food, and water. In general the
victims were very satisfied with the relief service.
Many residents were afraid to get back to their
houses even when their houses (marked as class
A or B) were not condemned, due to their fear of
future earthquakes and the potential for damage
to their homes. Temporary housing is scheduled
to be completed by September 2009 (before
winter arrives) for the victims, figure 7. These
houses will be on a base isolation system to pro-
tect residents from future earthquakes. There
were more than 30,000 victims settling in more
than 160 campsites.
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Fig. 5
(a) Damage to rigid
connection of a transformer.
(b) Typical damage to
pedestal box.
a. b.
Fig. 6
(a) Steel anchors installed
after the earthquake to
avoid sliding of
transformers.
(b) Unanchored batteries’
racks in substation.
a. b.
Fig. 7
One of the relief campite in
L’Aquila set up by the Civil
Defence.
2.12.8 Conclusions
Performance of lifelines during the April 6 event
may be considered generally good if compared
to the extended losses related to buildings. This
is because: (1) the main damaged areas were
evacuated after the earthquake and their access
was prohibited; and (2) the emergency manage-
ment was effective in limiting the downtime of
essential services.
Damages to structures of wastewater manage-
ment plants reduced the service level, but even in
this case, the evacuation reduced the demand of
about 40%.
Critical element of the transportation network
did not suffer any significant damage, experi-
enced only in secondary branches of the net-
work. Reduction of the traffic flow capacity was
mainly due to debris from collapsed/damaged
structures adjacent to the road in urban areas
and to rock falls and landslides in mountainous
areas.
From the seismic risk reduction point of view, it
was concluded that components in facilities
should be anchored and that the use of flexible
connections should become a standard practice.
As for the emergency management, the Civil
Defence effectively coordinated a rapid and
effective response. Chief executive and adminis-
trators of lifelines networks participated to the
strategic decision making process since the very
beginning of the post-event emergency-man-
agement. The cooperation with the Civil Defence
was continuous during all the phases of the
emergency management ensured via daily
meetings.
Finally more than 160 relief camps were prop-
erly managed. It can be concluded that the
emergency management of lifelines networks
provided a rapid and resilient response to the
earthquake. The emergency management pro-
cedures implemented for the physical and func-
tional restoration of lifelines network, after a
proper codification, may become a reference
model for the Civil Defence at international level.
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